Living Under Siege
When you walk through the streets of Tehran, flags, banners and slogans commemorating those killed in the recent war—and particularly the late leader—are impossible to miss. Although it has been several months since the sound of bombs and missiles was last heard in Tehran, and the latest US attacks were limited to southern Iran and cities in that region, the atmosphere in the capital suggests that the story is far from over.
At the same time, women today appear to have more freedom than ever to move around the city without headscarves. The government's overriding concern, however, is to strengthen unity among the population and confront the foreign enemy. The war may have fallen silent for now, but it continues in another form: through the siege of Iran.
The government is calling on people to show maximum resistance to the siege and to the hardships and constraints it has imposed. Its message is clear: the strategic victory achieved against American imperialism can only be brought to its final conclusion through popular resistance to the siege.
By refraining from intervening in women's lifestyles and dress on the one hand, while encouraging public resistance to the foreign war and siege on the other, the government appears to be attempting to bridge some of the deep divisions within Iranian society. So far, this approach seems to have worked.
But what has the siege meant for Iran's economy? Can the Iranian economy withstand a prolonged siege? And how much will the economic consequences of the siege influence Iran's broader strategy?
A Look at the Macroeconomic Indices
Over the past year, following the outbreak of the 12-day war and Iran's entry into successive cycles of war and ceasefire, inflation has reached historically unprecedented levels. Inflation in June climbed to 88.6 percent, the highest level recorded since Iran began systematically collecting price data. The figure below shows the official inflation rate reported by Iran's Statistical Center.
The latest official GDP data for Iran cover the quarter ending in March 2026. Real GDP growth, reported at an annualized rate, was negative 3.6 percent during that period, indicating a severe contraction in the real economy following the shock of the 40-day war. This compares with growth of 2.5 percent in the quarter ending in December 2025.
The contraction has had serious consequences for employment. Labor-market data show that in the quarter ending in June 2026, the number of employed people fell by 450,000 compared with the same period a year earlier. As a result, the unemployment rate rose by 1.8 percentage points to 9.1 percent.
Much of this decline occurred in Iran's industrial sector. In other words, Israeli and American bombardment of industrial facilities has had a direct impact on the livelihoods and employment of Iranians.
The scale of the damage becomes clearer when placed in historical perspective. Between June 2005 and June 2025, net employment in Iran's industrial sector increased by 2.2 million—a remarkably modest gain over two decades. Yet in just one year, from June 2025 to June 2026, 630,000 industrial jobs were lost.
In other words, Iran's industrial sector, which had managed to add jobs gradually despite two decades of international sanctions, suddenly lost a substantial share of those hard-won employment gains as a result of the war.
There is another important point: for many Iranians, having a job does not necessarily mean escaping poverty. Although the government has not published official poverty statistics for two years, estimates suggest that more than one additional decile of Iran's population has fallen into poverty over the past year.
There can be little doubt that the war and the siege have had tangible and lasting consequences for the welfare of ordinary Iranians.
Trade from the Southern Coast
Energy and energy-related products—including crude oil, petroleum products, gas condensates and petrochemicals—account for approximately 85 percent of Iran's exports. Almost all of these products are shipped from Iran's southern coastline.
A maritime blockade of Iran therefore puts the entire export complex at risk.
At best, experts believe that by substituting Iran's land borders and its Caspian Sea access in the north, Iran could maintain only around 25 percent of its normal exports if the blockade were to continue over the long term.
Without foreign-exchange earnings, imports will also inevitably suffer. If Iran were able to maintain only one-quarter of its normal exports, it could import less than $20 billion worth of goods a year without drawing down its foreign-exchange reserves. That amount would barely be sufficient to cover essential imports.
The problem is that more than 90 percent of Iran's essential imports also enter through the country's southern maritime borders. As a result, even food and medicine face growing difficulties under a blockade.
In short, a prolonged maritime blockade of Iran would inflict potentially irreversible damage on the country's economy, both by cutting off revenue and by disrupting trade, with serious humanitarian consequences.
This is why the distinction between Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz and a blockade imposed on Iran is important. If Iran's closure of the Strait has so far mainly pushed up oil prices while the global economy has managed to absorb its consequences, a maritime blockade of Iran is not merely an economic instrument. Over the long term, it could become a humanitarian crisis.
Resistance, and Nothing but Resistance
Signs of frustration with the continuation of the war can be seen in parts of Iranian society. Many people want to see a lasting ceasefire, a reversal of record-high inflation and a return of vitality to their businesses.
But there is another segment of society that continues to call for resistance. At night, people carrying flags through Iranian cities still express support for continuing the war—and even for revenge over the killing of their former leader.
From the perspective of this group, whatever the circumstances, and regardless of the human cost of the siege, resistance and war should not be abandoned until revenge has been achieved.
It is unclear how closely Iran's current key decision-makers share this view. But it would be wrong to assume that such an approach has no supporters among those making decisions.
This may explain why Iran's sensitivity to the consequences of the blockade could be lower than the other side's sensitivity to the consequences of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
The implication is that it is difficult to envisage a scenario leading to a durable peace—particularly when the United States is also unwilling to abandon sanctions, while Iran's principal demand is precisely their removal. At the same time, Washington appears to believe that it can tolerate the current situation in the Strait over the long term.
It is ordinary people who must live with—and endure—the current economic conditions in Iran. And those conditions could become even more difficult in the days and months ahead if the siege continues. Government officials have repeatedly apologized for these circumstances, but they have also attributed them to the country's state of war—a state of affairs whose end remains impossible to predict.
Pouya Jabal Ameli Economist and former editor-in-chief of Donya-e-Eqtesad Daily